

Message Text

SECRET

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12

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C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (CORRECT LAST SENTENCE PARAGRAPH 6.)

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SECDEF

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SUBJECT: HIGHLIGHTS: POST-MEETING DISCUSSIONS, SEPTEMBER 20,
1974 (SALT TWO - 438)

1. REDUCTIONS. SHCHUKIN (TO BROWN - MAY, A-594) BEGAN BY ASKING WHY THE US WAS MAKING REDUCTIONS THE FIRST ISSUE TO BE TAKEN UP. HE RETURNED TO THIS THEME SEVERAL TIMES AND DEVOTED THE GREATER PART OF HIS COMMENTS TO IT. HE NOTED THAT DEVELOPING A COMMON MEASURE FOR THE PURPOSE OF COMPARING THE TWO FORCES WAS THE PRIORITY ISSUE, WHETHER OR NOT REDUCTIONS WERE TO BE CARRIED OUT. HE QUESTIONED WHETHER IT WAS PRACTICAL TO STRAT OUR BY DISCUSSING REDUCTIONS WHICH WOULD VERY LIKELY RUN INTO OPPOSITION FROM THE MILITARY ON BOTH SIDES.

2. IN RESPONSE TO CONTINUED QUESTIONING BY SHCHUKIN OF THE DESIRABILITY OF BEGINNING WITH AN EXPLORATION OF REDUCTIONS IN THE LIGHT OF HIS CONCERN ABOUT WHETHER THEY WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE, BROWN POINTED OUT THE US WAS NOT THINKING OF CHANGES BY A LARGE FACTOR, BUT RATHER OF CHANGES BY SOME PERCENTAGE. SHCHUKIN REPLIED THAT IN THAT CASE THE MAIN PURPOSE ACHIEVED BY REDUCTIONS WOULD BE PUBLIC RELATIONS AND REDUCTIONS THEREFORE WERE PROBABLY NOT A PRIME ISSUE.

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3. ROWNY ASKED BELETSKY (A-595) WHETHER THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP AGREED THE SIDES COULD ACHIEVE MUTUAL REDUCTIONS BEFORE 1985. BELETSKY WOULD NOT ANSWER THE QUESTION DIRECTLY AND SAID THAT ANY DISCUSSION OF REDUCTIONS WOULD HAVE TO BE CONSIDERED UNDER THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY. ALTHOUGH PRESSED, HE WOULD NOT DECLARE THE SOVIET MILITARY AS BEING AGREEABLE TO REDUCTIONS.

4. LATER IN THE CONVERSATION, BELETSKY ASKED WHETHER THE SOVIET SIDE NEEDED TO CUT DOWN TO THE US LEVEL BEFORE THE SIDES WOULD BEGIN A MUTUAL PROCESS OF REDUCTION. ROWNY SAID THAT THE MAIN POINT WAS THAT BOTH SIDES REDUCE TO THE SAME LOWER AGGREGATE BY 1985; THE PHASING COULD BE WORKED OUT SO THAT ALL THE REDUCTIONS WERE NOT LEFT FOR THE LAST FEW YEARS. BELETSKY THEN ASKED IF THE AGGREGATE THROW-WEIGHT OF ICBMS AND SLBMS ALSO HAD TO BE MADE EQUAL BY 1985. ROWNY SAID HE DID NOT THINK IT REALISTIC TO EXPECT THE SOVIETS TO REDUCE TO THE US MISSILE THROW-WEIGHT LEVEL BY 1985. IF THE SOVIETS WOULD AGREE TO REDUCE THEIR LARGE THROW-WEIGHT ADVANTAGE, ROWNY FELT THAT THE US WOULD NOT INCREASE ITS LEVEL. ON THE OTHER HAND, IF THE SOVIETS INCREASED THEIRS, STAYED AT THE SAME LEVEL, OR DID NOT REDUCE FAST ENOUGH, THE THE US WOULD HAVE NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO BEGIN INCREASING THE THROW-WEIGHT OF ITS MISSILES AFTER 1977. IN SHORT, ROWNY ARGUED THAT THERE HAD TO BE A MARKED CONVERGENCE TOWARDS EQUALITY IN THROW-WEIGHT OF MISSILES BY 1985.

5. AIR MOBILES. SHCHUKIN (TO BROWN-MAY, A-594) NOTED THAT BOMBERS WERE SO FAR NOT COVERED BY AGREEMENT AND RAISED THE QUESTION OF BOMBERS ARMED WITH MISSILES AND BALLISTIC MISSILES LAUNCHED FROM CARGO PLANES. BROWN SAID THE LATTER WERE IN THE SAME CATEGORY AS LAND-MOBILE ICBMS, WHICH WERE LESS SUITABLE FOR THE US THAN THE USSR FOR VARIOUS REASONS. MAY NOTED THAT, ASSUMING NEITHER COUNTRY WANTED TO ATTACK THE OTHER, IT SHOULD MAKE LITTLE DIFFERENCE TO EITHER WHETHER THE OTHER MOUNTED ITS MISSILES ON SOME NEW PLATFORM IN ORDER TO MAKE THEM BETTER ABLE TO SURVIVE AN ATTACK. SHCHUKIN AGREED, BUT CALLED ATTENTION TO THE POSSIBLE DIFFICULTY OF VERIFYING THE NUMBER OF MISSILES WHICH COULD BE FIRED FROM CIVILIAN AIRPLANES. AFTER SOME DISCUSSION IT WAS AGREED THAT THE QUESTION OF VERIFICATION WAS NOT CLEAR CUT EITHER WAY AND THAT IT SHOULD BE EXPLORED FURTHER

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AT A LATER DATE.

6. FORCES TO BE COVERED BY NEW AGREEMENT. BELETSKY ASKED ROWNY (A-595) WHICH FORCES SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN A NEW AGREEMENT. WHEN ROWNY ASKED WHICH FORCES HE WANTED TO SPEAK TO, BELETSKY SAID THAT HE WOULD FIRST ADDRESS STRATEGIC BOMBERS WHERE THE US HAD AN ADVANTAGE. ROWNY AGREED THAT THE US HAD AN ADVANTAGE IN NUMBERS BUT THAT NUMBERS OF BOMBERS DID

NOT TELL THE STORY; THERE WERE OTHER WAYS OF MEASURING THE POTENTIAL POWER OF A SYSTEM. BELETSKY SAID THE SOVIETS SAW THE POTENTIAL OF BOMBERS AS MUCH GREATER THAN THE MERE RATIO OF THE NUMBERS OF BOMBERS ON EACH SIDE AND FOR THE FIRST TIME USED THE TERM THROW-WEIGHT. ROWNY TOLD HIM THAT WHAT THE SOVIET SIDE CONSIDERED AN ADVANTAGE IN BOMBER NUMBERS AND BOMBER THROW-WEIGHT WAS IN REALITY ERODED BY THEIR LARGER ADVANTAGE IN SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES AND FIGHTER INTERCEPTORS.

7. THE DISCUSSION NEXT TURNED TO MISSILES AND WHEN ROWNY INDICATED THAT THE SOVIETS HAD A 50 PER CENT ADVANTAGE IN NUMBERS OF MISSILES, AND A MUCH GREATER POTENTIAL FOR DESTRUCTION, BELETSKY DID NOT CHALLENGE THIS.

8. SOVIET PERCEPTIONS FO US CAPABILITIES.
BROWN (A-594) ASKED WHETHER SHCHUKIN HAD SEEN CHARTS SHOWING THE SOVIET MILITARY'S PERCEPTIONS OF RELATIVE US AND SOVIET STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES; COMPARING US AND SOVIET PERCEPTIONS WOULD HELP OUR WORK. SHCHUKIN SAID HE HAD NOT, BUT WOULD THINK ABOUT SUCH A POSSIBILITY.

9. BELETSKY (TO ROWNY, A-595) AGAIN EXPRESSED INTEREST IN SEEING THE PICTURE FROM US POINT OF VIEW. ROWNY REMINDED HIM THAT HE OWED A RESPONSE WITH GRAPHICS ON SOVIET PERCEPTIONS. HE PROMISED TO DO THIS. JOHNSON

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